INTRODUCTION TO THE
“LOCKETT V. OHIO AT 40 SYMPOSIUM”:
RETHINKING THE DEATH PENALTY 40 YEARS
AFTER THE U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION
Margery B. Koosed*

Thank you to our speakers (present and participating by web),
attending lawyers, law students, faculty, staff, members of the community
here and participating by web–thank you all for joining in our Lockett v.
Ohio at 40 Symposium. 1
I am Marge Koosed, a Professor of Law Emerita here at the
University of Akron School of Law. I have taught in the area of criminal
law, criminal procedure, and death penalty law for over 40 years. I first
arrived at the law school in 1974, the same year Ohio enacted the death
penalty law we will be discussing, Ohio Revised Code Section 2929.04.
Indeed, as I recall, as then Coordinator of the Legal Clinic’s Appellate
Review Office, I assisted four death-sentenced Akron-area inmates on
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court challenging that law.
Ultimately, the Court accepted review in two other cases—that of Akronarea death row inmate Sandra Lockett and Cincinnati-area juvenile death
row inmate Willie Lee Bell. The Court’s response, set forth in the Lockett
v. Ohio 2 decision, is our subject today.
As we will see, the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Lockett hinges on
individualized sentencing, on respect for the uniqueness of each
individual facing a capital charge. Though we will focus on defendant’s
lives, as the Court did in that case, I want us to acknowledge at this time
the uniqueness and respect we also owe the victims of homicide, and the
loss experienced by their families, in all of these death penalty cases. The
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1. An audio recording of the Lockett Symposium is available at this link on YouTube (Oct.
15, 2018), and program materials are available at this link.
2. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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Supreme Court would later make that clear in Payne v. Tennessee. 3 But
the loss remains—we know that no law or Supreme Court decision can
restore those lives lost.
This past spring, the Center for Constitutional Law here at the
University of Akron School of Law, one of two established by Congress
in celebration of the bicentennial of the Constitution, issued a call for
papers to commemorate the July 3, 1978 Lockett v. Ohio decision from
the U.S. Supreme Court. As our call related:
Argued by the brilliant Professor Tony Amsterdam, the decision laid the
framework for narrowing application of the death penalty. Lockett not
only overturned Ohio’s 1974 era death penalty law, it heralded the significance and breadth of mitigating factors that must be considered by
jurors and judges making the life or death decision in the penalty phase
of capital cases, and tapped in to issues of disproportionate sentencing
(those decided and yet to be).

The papers submitted are published here as part of this symposium.
Our writing contributors include all of Sandra’s counsel in the U.S.
Supreme Court, her co-defendant’s counsel, law professors at New York
University and City University of New York, a Fulbright scholar in
France, and the National Mitigation Coordinator for federal public
defender agencies.
In addition, in attendance we have Sandra Lockett’s co-counsel in
the state appellate and lower federal courts, and Sandra Lockett Young
herself. Finally, we are pleased that the executive director of Ohioans to
Stop Executions, and both the executive director and chief researcher of
the nationally recognized Washington D.C. based Death Penalty
Information Center (DPIC), are participating by web. We also have two
of the most experienced death penalty defense litigators in Ohio available
for comments.
We proceed to first look at the Lockett litigation itself, hearing from
her counsel, other counsel, and from Sandra Lockett. Then we address
the impact of the Supreme Court decision on death penalty litigation, its
significance, and engage in some critique with our writers. Finally, we
discuss the current condition and future of the death penalty, nationally
and in Ohio.
Before we address the Lockett litigation itself, it helps to sketch out
the historical context and a few critical Supreme Court precedents. As
described in Chapter 1 of Hugo Bedau’s classic work The Death Penalty

3.

501 U.S. 808 (1991).
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in America: Current Controversies, 4 in the colonial and early American
period, execution was a common sentence for murder (but not
manslaughter), and at times rape, robbery, and kidnapping. 5 An evolution
away from the death penalty began in the 19th century when Pennsylvania
and other jurisdictions began to distinguish first degree murder and second
degree murder, the latter being punished by incarceration, and states
began to choose incarceration for commission of other major felonies. 6 A
few states abolished the death penalty in all cases.7 In the 1932 decision
of Powell v. Alabama, 8 and reaffirmed in the 1963 Gideon v. Wainwright
case, 9 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that impoverished capitally-charged
defendants were entitled to counsel paid for at state expense, to assure
reliable determinations of guilt or innocence.
Over this entire period, when a deliberating jury found a capital
defendant guilty, the jury would immediately proceed to simultaneously
deliberate on whether to recommend mercy (a life sentence) or not—
hearing no additional evidence respecting the appropriateness of a death
or life sentence. 10 Few states imposed a mandatory death sentence–
instead the jury was given full discretion, and little, if any, information to
make this literally life or death decision. 11
In the 1960’s an informal moratorium on carrying out executions
developed, due to concerns about race discrimination, arbitrary
impositions, and wrongful convictions. 12 In 1971, the U.S. Supreme
Court agreed to examine this death penalty system. In the landmark case
of Furman v. Georgia, 13 argued by the same Professor Tony Amsterdam
who would later argue Sandra Lockett’s case, the Supreme Court ruled
the system violated the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment
clause and the Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection
clauses. Two justices found the death penalty per se unconstitutional. 14
Three found that discretionary sentencing, unguided by legislatively

4. HUGO BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES (Oxford
University Press 1997).
5. Id. at 3-4.
6. Id. at 4-6.
7. Id. at 7-8.
8. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
9. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
10. BEDAU, supra note 4, at 5-6
11. Id.
12. Id. at 13-16.
13. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
14. Id. at 305-06 (Brennan, J., concurring) and id. at 370-71 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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defined standards, was unconstitutional. 15 All of the death sentences then
imposed throughout the country were ultimately overturned and replaced
by life sentences.
Many state legislatures responded by passing new death penalty
provisions establishing guided discretion systems, using as a model the
Model Penal Code Section 210.6. 16 Other states adopted mandatory death
sentencing schemes. In 1976, the Court heard five cases addressing five
of these legislative responses.
In Gregg v. Georgia, 17 the Court (5-4) upheld the guided discretion
scheme in Georgia that included three features: a requirement of proof of
statutory aggravating circumstances that narrowed the class of eligible
murderers, allowed for consideration of mitigating circumstances calling
for a sentence less than death, and required state appellate review directed
at assuring against arbitrary and capricious or discriminatory deathsentencing. 18 The sentencing schemes of Florida and Texas appeared to
roughly approximate these requirements, and were upheld in Proffitt v.
Florida and Jurek v. Texas. 19
At the same time, in 1976, the mandatory death sentencing schemes
established by North Carolina and Louisiana were struck down because
they undermined reliability as jurors were sometimes refusing to convict
when the death sentence was automatic, and because mandatory
sentencing was not individualized–it failed to permit consideration of the
character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of
the particular offense. 20
This is the backdrop when Ohio’s 1974 era death penalty legislation
reaches the Court two years later, in 1978. Ohio’s scheme provided for
proof of aggravating circumstances and a two-stage appellate review, but
required a death sentence unless the sentencing judge found one of the
following by a preponderance of the evidence: 1) the victim had induced
or facilitated the offense, or 2) it was unlikely the offender would have
committed the offense but for the fact the offender was under duress,
coercion, or strong provocation, or 3) the offense was primarily the
product of the offender’s psychosis or mental deficiency. 21
15. Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring), id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring), and id. at 313
(White, J. concurring).
16. American Law Institute, Proposed Official Draft 1962.
17. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
18. Id. at 205-07.
19. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
20. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293, 304 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S.
633, 637 (1976). Both of these cases, and Jurek, were argued by Professor Tony Amsterdam.
21. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 593-94 (1978) (referencing then §§ O.R.C. 2929.03 and 2929.04).
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In providing for consideration of a limited list of possible mitigating
circumstances calling for a penalty less than death, this legislation was
akin to those upheld in Texas and Florida two years earlier. But it still did
not permit the sentencing judge to consider as mitigating factors Sandra
Lockett’s character, her prior record (minor misdemeanors but no felony
offenses), her age (of 21), 22 her lack of specific intent to cause death
(indeed, no one planned to kill the pawnshop owner in the course of the
contemplated robbery, but the owner grabbed the gun and it went off), and
her relatively minor part in the crime of robbery (even acceding to the
prosecution’s theory of the case, which was based on testimony from the
trigger-person who struck a deal, she was not even in the pawnshop). 23 As
we will see, the Supreme Court in Lockett (6-2) finds the Ohio statute
offends the Eighth Amendment principle of individualized sentencing
identified in Woodson v. North Carolina, and that Ohio’s quasimandatory sentencing scheme must be struck down. 24
The two year period between Jurek, Proffitt, and the Court’s decision
in Lockett may have been critical. The delay was brought about by Ohio,
unlike the two other states, having provided for an intermediate appellate
review in the district courts of appeal before a death case proceeded to the
Ohio Supreme Court. Sandra Lockett’s co-counsel Joel Berger at the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund later suggested that had Ohio’s scheme
reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 1976 with Jurek, the similarities
between the Ohio and Texas schemes might have led to the Court finding
Ohio’s scheme fell into the “Jurek sinkhole,” and Sandra Lockett’s death
sentence may have been affirmed. Instead, the Lockett decision’s
requirement that the sentencing jury be able to consider and give effect to
all relevant mitigating evidence prevailed. Over the following decade,
Florida’s 1976-approved system of limiting the sentencer to statutory
mitigating factors was unanimously found to violate the Lockett line of
cases (eventually, after 16 executions under it raising the issue).25
Similarly, Texas’ 1976-approved system also fell in most respects to
Lockett’s mandate. 26
As a direct consequence of the Lockett decision, Sandra Lockett’s
death sentence, and that of about one hundred others on Ohio death row,
was overturned.
22. The companion case of Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978), involved the younger age of 16,
23. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 590, 597.
24. Id.
25. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987); see DAVID VON DREHLE, AMONG THE LOWEST
OF THE DEAD: THE CULTURE OF DEATH ROW 300-01 (1995).
26. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); but see Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993).
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As an aside, one might wonder how Sandra Lockett was convicted
of the death-eligible crime of aggravated murder with the aggravating
circumstance of felony murder on these facts. The prosecution was also
concerned, and thrice offered her a plea to a lesser offense after a codefendant who was in the pawnshop was sentenced to life due to mental
deficiency, and after the trigger-person received life through a plea deal.
The prosecution once offered a plea to voluntary manslaughter and
aggravated robbery, and then just prior to, and during trial, a plea to
aggravated murder without specifications. 27 She refused the offers, and
was convicted on the basis of a felony-murder mens rea jury instruction
that would, a year later, be declared unconstitutional as creating a
presumption that an accomplice intended to kill, a presumption that
conflicted with the burden that is always on the prosecutor to prove the
element of intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt. 28 Sadly, her counsel
failed to object to this jury instruction at trial, and Sandra’s later petition
for federal habeas corpus relief to overturn her conviction on this basis
was denied because trial counsel had not preserved the issue. 29 Sandra
was released on parole in 1993, returned to Akron, and completed her
parole period. She has been kind enough to speak to my classes often, and
to do so today.
With that backdrop, the symposium proceeded with Sandra Lockett,
Gerry Simmons (her co-counsel in the state appeals and lower federal
courts), and writing contributor Dennis Balske (her brother and codefendant James Lockett’s counsel), relating their insights on the trial,
state appeal, and later federal habeas corpus litigation. Sandra described
the isolation she felt, death row conditions, how she adjusted to life by
living each day as fully as she could, and what effective representation of
a capital defendant should entail from the client’s perspective. Gerry
Simmons focused on the pre-trial and trial aspects of the case. He got
involved in Sandra’s case before trial when her family retained him for
$1,000 after Sandra and her family were disappointed by her appointed
counsel. But he was told by the trial judge that he would not be allowed
to take an active role because he was an out-of-town lawyer and that local
counsel would handle the case. He returned the retainer to the family. He
regrets not being involved, because he would have made needed
objections to the court’s actions. But on the other hand, he rejoices in the
fact that Sandra’s conviction and death sentence ultimately led to life

27.
28.
29.

Id. at 591-92.
See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
See Lockett v. Arn, 740 F.2d 407 (6th Cir. 1984).
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sentences for hundreds of others in Ohio and around the country due to
the U.S. Supreme Court decision. Simmons later co-counselled the state
appeals and federal habeas proceedings with the very well-respected
Capital University Law School Clinical Professor Max Kravitz, who has
since passed away. Simmons went to Cleveland Marshall Law School,
practices criminal defense in Columbus, has handled many capital cases,
with no death verdicts for the last 34 years, and has served on the boards
of the Franklin County Public Defender Commission and the Ohio
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Here, he provides death
penalty practice pointers in addition to his thoughts on the case.
At the symposium and in his written submission, Dennis Balske,
counsel for Sandra’s brother (and separately tried co-defendant) James
Lockett, describes James’ litigation which included a mistrial and retrial.
He relates his impressions of the trial judge and prosecutors, and the later
gross and tawdry professional misconduct of the trial judge. Dennis
Balske is well-known to capital defense litigators, having served as what
I would call a “guru” in the field. Dennis Balske got his J.D. from Ohio
State Law School and taught their criminal defense practicum from 19751978. He then joined the Southern Poverty Law Center, defending
capitally charged defendants throughout the South, and becoming the
Center’s Legal Director. During that period, at my invitation, Dennis
wrote the seminal article on defending capital cases for the Akron Law
Review. 30 In 1986, he entered private practice, and later founded the
Alabama Criminal Defense Lawyers Association and served on the board
of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, chairing its
Death Penalty and Amicus Curiae Committees. Dennis Balske eventually
relocated to Portland, Oregon where he spent nine years in the federal
public defender office, and is now in private practice specializing in postconviction litigation.
At the U.S. Supreme Court, Sandra was represented by Professor
Anthony Amsterdam, and by Peggy Cooper-Davis and Joel Berger, then
with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (“LDF”). LDF was founded by
Thurgood Marshall in 1940; it has fought against racial discrimination and
defended murder cases around the country.
Writing contributor and advocate at the U. S. Supreme Court, now
New York University Professor, Tony Amsterdam provides a tribute to
Sandra Lockett for this symposium that concisely and beautifully conveys
the highs and lows of capital defense litigation, the importance of the case

30. Dennis N. Balske, New Strategies for the Defense of Capital Cases, 13 AKRON LAW REV.
331 (1979).
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he won that has significantly reduced the frequency of seeking and
imposing death in this country, and the hope that it will eventually lead to
abolition. Amsterdam is a brilliant legal scholar and litigator, the most
accomplished Clinical Professor in the United States (first at Penn, then
Stanford, then NYU), and indeed, through his work on the ABA’s
McCrate Report, he was instrumental in assuring that all law students get
ample skills training. For decades Tony Amsterdam was the foremost pro
bono attorney and advocate on civil rights and criminal cases in the U.S.
When a case is headed to the Supreme Court, Tony was the person you
wanted to argue it, or if that is or was not possible, you sought his insights
and direction. I had the privilege of being part of Tony’s working groups
on several death penalty cases–the words “amazing” and “awe-inspiring”
do not do him justice. Unfortunately, Tony has now retired from teaching
and is “living in the boondocks” as he told me, where videoconferencing
is not practicable, and for other reasons he has somewhat limited his pro
bono workload. But he could not let these circumstances prevent his
participation in this symposium. He asked that I “read this short tribute to
Sandra with my love” at this conference. He closes his moving tribute
with the observation that when abolition is achieved “Sandra Lockett,
whose strength of will and power to survive we are commemorating here,
will take her rightful place in the history of the struggle for decency in
criminal justice”.
Now at NYU Law School as well, writing contributor Professor
Peggy Cooper Davis co-counselled Sandra’s case in the Supreme Court
while at LDF. She now teaches constitutional law, evidence, and social
sciences and the law. Unfortunately, she taught class and could not join
the symposium, but also asked that we include her letter. In it, Professor
Davis provides further insight into race and the death penalty, and recalls
how she marveled at Sandra Lockett’s “courage under what seemed to be
the surreal circumstances” of being sent to death row while so “remotely
linked to the killings of which (she was) accused,” and the “raging sense
of injustice she must feel.” She posits that “Justices of the Supreme Court
must have sensed the disproportionality of Sandra Lockett’s sentence on
any account of the events leading to the pawn broker’s death.”
Joel Berger, then also at LDF, co-counselled and sat second-chair at
the Lockett oral argument. Now in private practice in New York City
specializing in civil rights cases, submitted his recollections in writing. In
his piece, Berger recalls the briefing process, the expectation that the Bell
case would become the lead case, and some difficult moments during the
oral argument.
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Transitioning to the impact of the Lockett decision and its
significance, as Professor Tony Amsterdam noted, Lockett has led to a
focus on mitigation as a defense against imposition of the death penalty.
Writing contributor Russ Stetler has served as the National Mitigation
Coordinator for the federal death penalty projects for the last thirteen
years and has authored many articles on mitigation investigation in his
work around the country over the last 38 years. He writes that Lockett has
engendered a team approach to capital defense litigation, with mitigation
specialist professionals conducting full social history investigations to
provide defense lawyers and fact-finders with information leading to or
constituting relevant mitigating evidence, and he details capital defense
counsel’s duty to investigate and present such relevant mitigating
evidence.
Writing contributor City University of New York Law School
Professor Jeff Kirchmeier is a Case Western Reserve University Law
School graduate who was a staff attorney at the Arizona Capital
Representation Project. He previously taught at Tulane Law School. He
has written extensively on criminal procedure, constitutional law, and the
death penalty, including the racial implications of use of that penalty in
his book Imprisoned by the Past: Warren McCleskey, Race, and the
American Death Penalty. He writes that by requiring the consideration of
individualized mitigating factors, the Lockett decision saved the death
penalty, but that it may be a poison pill which at the same time condemned
the death penalty by means of creeping arbitrary or discriminatory
decision-making.
Writing contributor Jordan Berman is presently doing federal habeas
and state clemency defense as a research and writing attorney at the
Federal Public Defender in Columbus. He also serves as an adjunct
professor on appellate advocacy at the Ohio State University Moritz
School of Law. His written contribution to the symposium focuses on
Justice White’s Lockett concurrence. Justice White dissented from the
plurality’s position on consideration of mitigating circumstances, 31 but
concurred in reversal of the death sentence in this case because there was
no finding that Sandra Lockett “possessed a purpose to cause the death of
the victim.” 32 As Berman discusses, this concurrence led to an evolving
mens rea standard for death-eligibility in later cases addressing

31.
32.

438 U.S. at 621-24.
Id. at 625.
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disproportionate sentencing. 33 He urges the Court to maintain Justice
White’s mandate.
Writing contributor Karen Steele is a capital defense lawyer in
Oregon. With her J.D. from Washington University, she has written on
neuroscience and the law and mens rea. She writes about the threat to
Lockett’s mandate arising from double-edged evidence, i.e. rightfully
mitigating evidence that could be seen as aggravating, often as
establishing future dangerousness. She urges specialized jury instructions
to assure that the evidence is seen solely as mitigating.
Steele’s concern is well-appreciated in most death-sentencing states,
where aggravating and mitigating circumstances are both found or
determined in the penalty phase, and/or where future dangerousness is
specified as an aggravating factor. As I have written elsewhere,34 Ohio’s
present scheme differs from that of other states in ways that reduce this
concern. Future dangerousness is not specified as an aggravating factor in
Ohio. Further, in Ohio, the statutory aggravating circumstances are set
forth in the indictment, proven beyond a reasonable doubt in the trial (not
penalty) phase, and if proven and non-duplicative, are carried over into
the penalty phase with no expansion–it is only the statutory aggravating
circumstances so proven that are weighed against mitigation. 35 The
penalty phase is designed for the presentation of mitigation alone, and the
prosecutor is limited to presenting only such evidence that denies or rebuts
the existence of those mitigating factors raised by the defense.36 Because
no non-statutory aggravating circumstances are to be weighed, it is less
likely that rebuttal of a mitigating circumstance will lead to aggravating
weight being accorded. In addition, because Ohio judges “should not
instruct on mitigating factors not raised by the defense,” 37 there is less
likelihood the jury will learn of other mitigating factors that were not
presented and somehow turn their absence into aggravating facts. So Ohio
practice provides some assurances against Ms. Steele’s quite-appropriate
concern.

33. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987)
(like Lockett, felony-murder cases); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (imposition of death on
those with intellectual disabilities).
34. See Margery Koosed, “Rethinking How We Bifurcate: the Ohio Example” in Averting
Mistaken Executions by Adopting the Model Penal Code’s Exclusion of Death in the Presence of
Lingering Doubt, 19 NO. ILLINOIS LAW REV. 41, 104-07 (2001).
35. See Ohio Revised Code §§ 2929.03 & 2929.04.
36. State v. DePew, 528 N.E.2d 542 (1988).
37. Ohio Jury Instructions, Criminal CR 503.010, cmt. p. 78 (Ohio Judicial Conference,
3/2015) (citing DePew).
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Writing contributor Dr. Cynthia Boyer appears by web from France
where she teaches civil liberties, American Constitutional Law, and
Political Developments at the Institut National Universitaire
Champollion, Universite Toulouse Capitole. A Fulbright Alumni in U.S.
Politics and Law, she writes that it has been difficult to define mitigating
factors or their impacts on a fair trial, that the Supreme Court is divided
in its appreciation of the individualization mandate, and that there are
concerns about stare decisis.
Having a helpful picture of the impact of the Lockett decision, the
symposium proceeds to turn to the lingering concerns surrounding the
death penalty, and its possible future, with five go-to experts on the
subject. Writing contributor Kevin Werner is Executive Director of the
non-profit Ohioans to Stop Executions, on which I sit as a member of the
board. A day before the symposium, he penned an op-ed in the local
Akron Beacon Journal newspaper, entitled “Ohio’s Broken Death
Penalty.” 38 Werner relates the failures of Ohio’s system to protect
innocents from wrongful convictions and death sentences (Ohio has had
nine death-sentenced exonerees), the racial and geographic disparities in
imposition of the Ohio death penalty, the enormous costs in pursuing
death as opposed to life sentences, and the relative waste of taxpayer funds
as prosecutors fail to get the death penalty in almost 90% of these
expensive cases.
In discussion, four other experts on death penalty litigation
confirmed the Ohio experience, and that it is consistent with what is
occurring at the national level. Rob Dunham is Executive Director of the
Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC) in Washington D.C., the
nationally-recognized and oft-awarded resource of all things death
penalty. Before coming to the DPIC position in 2015, Rob litigated death
penalty cases and taught this area of the law at Villanova Law School.
Rob provides insights into the possible impact of Justice Kennedy’s
departure and replacement on the U.S. Supreme Court, recent trends in
race and geographic disparity, and relative costs of the death penalty.
Ngozi Ndulue, a capital defense litigator and Yale J.D., just joined the
DPIC as the Director of Research and Special Projects, having served in
a similar capacity at the Ohio Justice and Policy Center in Cincinnati, and
as Senior Director of Criminal Justice Programs at the national NAACP
in New York City. In discussion, she expanded on Rob’s points, and
speaks to the moral lessons gleaned from the Lockett decision.

38. AKRON BEACON J., Oct. 14, 2018, at https://www.ohio.com/opinion/20181014/kevinwerner-ohios-broken-death-penalty.
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Lastly, in discussion, are experienced Ohio capital defense litigators
David Stebbins and Jeff Gamso. David Stebbins is another Cleveland
Marshall J.D., and probably the most-experienced death penalty
appellate/post-conviction defense lawyer in Ohio. I first got to know
David when he started the death penalty section at the Ohio Public
Defender Office in 1982. I worked with him on capital defense training
materials and more for 11 years, when he went briefly to the Tennessee
Capital Resource Center. He returned to Ohio in 1995 and did capital
defense work in private practice until 2008, when he joined the Capital
Habeas Unit of the Federal Public Defenders Office in Columbus. He
provides a view from the federal habeas trenches, which bears out others’
concerns and more. Similarly, capital defense lawyer Jeff Gamso, now at
the Cuyahoga County Public Defender Appellate Division, formerly in
private practice in Toledo and Legal Director of the Ohio ACLU,
comments further on the importance of mitigation. He considers the
Lockett decision among the most significant of U.S. Supreme Court cases.
While much has been written here and elsewhere, given the
significance of the Lockett decision, there will undoubtedly be more to
come. We hope that by this Lockett v. Ohio at 40 Symposium, we have
“done justice” to this watershed case, its progeny, and those it has
impacted.

